negative shocks can disintegrate a match, leading to aggregate output volatility. When highskill workers are abundant, firms create different jobs for workers of different types. Only relatively large shocks destroy a match, and aggregate output volatility decreases. This result is summarized in section one, Proposition 3.
The model also predicts the observed increases in both wage inequality (Katz and Murphy 1992, Karoly 1992 ) and firm-level volatility (Comin and Philippon 2005) . In section two, I qualitatively compare the model economy with these empirical facts. In section three, I discuss some of the extant papers about GDP stabilization. I also relate my approach to recent advances in the labor search literature. After a few concluding remarks, I provide references and an Appendix containing a notation key and mathematical derivations.
The steady state of a multi-period (i.e. dynamic) version of the model is presented in a Supplemental Appendix, available upon request.
One-Period Model
The model extends the environment developed in Acemoglu (1999) to include unanticipated aggregate and match specific shocks. The shocks facilitate studying output volatility, or output's percent variation. In the model, firms open jobs, match with workers, and decide whether to hire their worker and produce. When the economy switches to an equilibrium in which firms create jobs intended for high-skill workers, output volatility decreases because the labor market stabilizes along its extensive margin.
Model Environment
A unit mass of workers passively waits to be matched, one-to-one, with a large number of firms. A fraction, φ, of workers possess superior skills, and the rest are low-skill workers.
I normalize the productivity of low-skill workers to h = 1, and high-skill workers have h = η > 1. Firms randomly match to a single worker, with no switching allowed. Each worker-firm pairing receives a match-specific idiosyncratic shock, and all firms face a common aggregate shock. Workers receive share β of output.
1 The production technology takes a Cobb-Douglas form in capital, k, and labor productivity, h. Production costs ψk; nonproductive firms incur no cost.
1 The search literature frequently uses a 'Nash bargaining' wage rule (Rogerson et al. 2005) . Shimer (2005) attacks this rule for not delivering the wage rigidity necessary to generate the observed volatility in the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Other ways to set wages have been proposed. For example, Hall (2005) specifies a rule with more wage stickiness. Since neither wage negotiation nor the vacancy-unemployment ratio is central to this paper, I impose the Nash bargaining solution.
Firms know φ and η; however, they select k without any knowledge of the shocks. I normalize ψ = (1 − β) and denote the share of labor by α. The expected value of an unmatched firm with capital k equals
The choice variables x H and x L stand for a firm's expected probability, once matched, of producing with a high-skill and low-skill worker, respectively. Thus, a firm expects to produce with a high-skill worker with probability φx H . Firms select k, x H , and x L to maximize (1).
Figure 4 outlines the sequence of events. (Acemoglu 1999) The optimal choice of capital depends on the distribution of skills, captured by φ and η. When φ and η are relatively low, firms create jobs suitable for either type of worker.
Equilibria
If enough workers have sufficiently large productivity, then firms open jobs specifically for high-skill workers. Since workers passively accept any match, an equilibrium consists of firms maximizing their expected value (1). Two equilibrium types emerge. A "pooling" equilibrium prevails when φ and η have relatively small values. When φ and η are relatively large, a "separating" equilibrium 2 prevails, and firms target high-skill workers. The skill 2 Acemoglu (1999) refers to this type of equilibrium as "separating" because firms select an amount of capital expecting to produce only when matched with a high-skill worker. Firms treat the two worker types in separate ways. In a "pooling" equilibrium, firms select a level of capital expecting to produce with either condition (2) dictates the prevailing equilibrium.
Skill Condition (Acemoglu 1999) 
When η < d, the skill condition (2) fails, and if η > d, then the skill condition (2) holds. Table 1 in the Appendix for a list of notation. Proposition 1 describes the relationship shared by the skill condition (2), the prevailing equilibrium, and the choice of capital. 
Firms create jobs without any knowledge of the aggregate shock, Z, or the idiosyncratic shock, ǫ. Firms select capacity k = k P = ab or k = k S = aη depending on whether the skill condition (2) holds. This irreversible technology decision costs nothing.
type of worker. In Acemoglu (1999) , firms do in fact produce with either type of worker in pooling equilibria and employ only high-skill workers in separating equilibria. In the current model this does not necessarily happen due to unanticipated shocks. However, the optimal capacity choice does not differ across the two models, so I use the same labels as Acemoglu. The equilibria should not be confused with the pooling and separating equilibria concepts standard in game theory.
Productivity Shocks and Volatility
After selecting k, firms observe Z, which can be interpreted as a shock to production or price. The aggregate shock 3 has a symmetric distribution around zero. Firms also learn the productivity of their match, summarized by h and ǫ. With probability φ, h = η, otherwise h = 1, as detailed above. The match specific shock, ǫ, comes from a uniform distribution on [ǫ,ǭ] with mean one. A matched firm with capital k and idiosyncratic shock ǫ can produce
Next, firms decide whether to hire their match and produce (3) at cost (1 − β) k, given h, k, Z, and ǫ. A firm produces whenever profits exceed costs. I refer to the hiring decision as labor's 'extensive margin'. Decisions along the extensive margin are the critical mechanism propagating the aggregate shock. Proposition 2 specifies the decision boundaries.
Proposition 2.
→ produce with high-skill workers only
→ produce with all workers.
Total output under either equilibrium can be calculated from the following equation (4).
1−α <ǭ to ensure some firms produce with low-skill workers and some firms do not produce when matched with high-skill workers in either equilibrium and for any realization of Z.
Proposition 3 states the main result; macro-economic shocks influence production less in a separating equilibrium than in a pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 3.
Aggregate output is less volatile in a separating equilibrium than in a pooling equilibrium. Symbolically,
Given the same aggregate shocks, output varies less in percentage terms in a separating equilibrium than in a pooling equilibrium. The proof is in the Appendix.
The effect of an aggregate productivity shock depends on the distribution of skills in the labor force. Switching from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium decreases output volatility. Employed workers are better suited to their jobs in the separating case.
In a pooling equilibrium, firms select k = k P = ab. This capacity choice is suboptimal for both the average low-skill worker and the average high-skill worker, which propagates the aggregate shock. In a separating equilibrium, firms pick k = k S = aη, the optimal choice for producing with the average high-skill worker. Aggregate shocks have less impact on production decisions in a separating equilibrium because the shocks have less effect on the extensive margin. To make this notion more precise, let B j i be the decision boundary (see Proposition 2) to hire and produce with a worker of type j ∈ {H, L} in equilibrium i ∈ {P, S}. A match, (i, j), with productivity B j i generates zero profits.
The boundary, B, varies more in a pooling equilibrium than in a separating equilibrium.
Hence, the labor market gains stability along the extensive margin when the economy jumps to the separating case. Even low-skill workers encounter less employment variation. The model economy switches to a separating equilibrium when the skill condition is met (just as in Acemoglu (1999) ). Then, firms exploit the skill distribution by creating jobs specifically for high-skill workers. Firms also modify their hiring strategies. Production decision boundaries compress relative to the boundaries in a pooling equilibrium, and the new boundaries are not as volatile. When profits are below the shutdown level, B, workers and firms are better off disintegrating their match. Worker-firm pairs tend to have better capacity-to-productivity matches in a separating equilibrium. Thus, when the economy switches to a separating equilibrium, hiring decisions stabilize along the extensive margin, reducing the propagation of the aggregate shock.
Discussion and Stylized Facts
The main finding from the model can be restated as follows. A gradual increase in the supply of skills induces firms to open new types of jobs. When the composition of jobs changes 4 , the economy shifts to a separating equilibrium. In the new equilibrium, there is a better match between the typical employee's skill level and firm capacity. Output volatility falls because shocks have less impact on hiring and production decisions. Thus, changes in the distribution of skills affects aggregate output volatility.
The connection between the labor market and aggregate volatility can help explain several stylized facts. In the data, wages are pro-cyclical and unemployment moves countercyclically. In the static model, wages equal a share of output, and output co-moves with the aggregate shock. Similarly, the employment rate, or fraction of workers actually producing, moves in tandem with the aggregate shock because firms react to high realizations of Z by becoming less selective employers. So, in a sense, the model economy features both procyclical wages and counter-cyclical unemployment. The model also captures the following stylized facts.
GDP Volatility Reduction
Consider the following two time series presented in Figure 2 My story goes as follows. The economy gained skilled workers throughout the 1970's.
By the mid-1980's, firms reacted by creating jobs tailored to high-skill workers. The average worker became better suited to his or her job. The labor market's ability to propagate the aggregate shock declined. So, GDP volatility suddenly fell. This corresponds to a switch from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium in the model economy.
Consider the situation where the skill condition (2) fails. The proportion of high-skill workers, φ, and the productivity of high-skill workers, η, must be relatively small, and firms select k = k P = ab. Firms expect to produce with any matched worker. Small increases in φ or η lead to small changes in output. When φ or η exogenously increase enough to satisfy the skill condition (2), the economy moves from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium. Firms select a level of capital suited to producing with high-skill workers, and the economy's aggregate output volatility suddenly falls.
The decline in output volatility occurs just as the economy moves from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium. The equilibrium switch happens because firms respond to the changing profit incentives created by increases in φ or η. Firms open new high-capacity jobs and modify their hiring strategies. On average, workers in a separating equilibrium produce with the optimal amount of capital; this alters the economy's responsiveness to aggregate shocks along labor's extensive margin. To disintegrate a match, a larger shock is required, and aggregate output volatility falls. Thus, the model economy generates the sudden and sustained volatility moderation observed in the data.
Increase in Wage Inequality
Wage inequality among workers grew (Katz and Murphy 1992, Karoly 1992 ) over roughly the same time period as GDP volatility moderated. So, it is tempting to imagine a connection between the volatility of output and income inequality. In the model, an exogenous progression in skills increases both macroeconomic stability and wage inequality. When the economy switches from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium, the skill premium increases (Acemoglu 1999) . The wages of low-skill workers react non-monotonically to the supply of skills, φ, and to skill-biased technical change, captured by η. When the skill condition (2) fails, an increase in φ has no impact on wage inequality. However, if the skill condition (2) holds, then the average wage for low-skill workers drops. An increase in η always amplifies wage inequality. Thus, an exogenous increase in η or φ tends to exacerbate the wage inequality between high-skill and low-skill workers. Comin and Philippon (2005) notes the correlation between the increase in firm-level risk and aggregate stabilization. In my model, a separating equilibrium has higher firmlevel volatility than a pooling equilibrium. That is, switching to a separating equilibrium increases output and profit volatility for individual firms even as aggregate volatility falls.
Increase in Firm-level Volatility
The explanation is the same as for wage inequality. In a pooling equilibrium, all firms produce and volatility depends on the match's properties, only. In the separating case, some firms produce with high-skill workers and with a large capacity, while others do not produce at all. Therefore, the variance in outcomes across individual firms increases when the economy jumps to a separating equilibrium. The supply of skills in the labor force has been dismissed as a cause of GDP volatility reduction because of an apparent timing problem. The stock of high-skill workers increased gradually, whereas volatility experienced a dramatic break. However, in this paper I have shown how a smooth increase in the proportion of high-skill workers can cause an abrupt change in aggregate output volatility. Thus, I offer a new solution to the volatility moderation puzzle. Future research will uncover its quantitative importance.
My approach builds on the search models of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . Models of this type feature a friction in the labor market; it takes time for workers and firms to meet.
Rogerson et al. (2005) 
Conclusion
There exists a connection between the decrease in US GDP volatility and the increase in both wage inequality and firm-level risk. Other explanations for these phenomena have been suggested. My labor market based theory is unique in offering a single explanation for all three. The theory relies on firms acting to maximize profits and an employment search friction, which are widely used assumptions.
In summary, propagation of the aggregate shock depends on the distribution of skills in the labor force. I extend the matching model developed in Acemoglu (1999) to demonstrate how a gradual increase in the supply of high-skill workers can cause a sudden decrease in aggregate output volatility. In the model, firms react to an influx of skills by changing the composition of jobs and by modifying their hiring strategies. When these extensive margin decisions change, so does the labor market's responsiveness to the aggregate shock.
The economy moves to a separating equilibrium and enters a state of quiescence. This corresponds to the sudden and sustained drop in US GDP volatility, which occurred in the early 1980's. The model also predicts pro-cyclical wages and output, increasing income inequality, and increasing firm-level volatility.
Lastly, demographic trends might conspire to make high-skill workers less abundant in the coming years. Firms may respond to the new skill distribution by creating jobs suitable for workers with a wide range of abilities. This could push the economy back into a pooling type equilibrium and increase aggregate output volatility.
Appendix

Table 1 -Symbols and Notation
Symbol Description Symbol Description Acemoglu (1999) contains a proof of Proposition 1. My model does not require any substantial changes. I replicate the proof for the sake of completeness, and I also derive the skill condition (2).
Workers accept all jobs because their outside option equals zero. Thus, an equilibrium is a set, {k, x H , x L }, maximizing each firms expected value (1). Firms maximize (1) according to the first order condition
where x H and x L are considered fixed. Setting x H = x L = 1 and solving (6) for k P gives
With x H = x L = 1 and k = k P , the expected value of an unmatched firm is
Setting x H = 1 and x L = 0 and solving (6) for k S gives
With x H = 1, x L = 0, and k = k S the expected value of an unmatched firm equals
and solving for η gives the skill condition (2).
Thus, either the pooling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium or the separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2
Proposition 2 can be rewritten in light of Proposition 1. I derive the rewritten version, Proposition 2 ′ , because it focuses on the hiring and production decisions at the relevant levels of capital. However, the proposition holds for all k.
′ .
If η < d, then a Pooling Equilibrium prevails and
If η > d, then a Separating Equilibrium prevails and
Proof of Proposition 2 ′ If η < d, then according to Proposition 1 a pooling equilibrium prevails and firms choose k = k P = ab. Firms produce when the value of a match is non-negative. Thus, if
then production occurs. Otherwise, the firm does not produce. Note that any x L > 0 or x H < 1 reduces profits at this ǫ.
Producing with a low-skill worker contributes to profits for suitably large realizations of ǫ.
, then according to Proposition 1 a separating equilibrium prevails and firms choose k = k S = aη. Again, firms produce whenever profits are non-negative. So, if
then production occurs. Otherwise, the firm does not produce. Any x L > 0 or x H < 1 reduces profits at this ǫ.
The four derivations above combine to form Proposition 2 ′ . A simple rewrite with a general k proves Proposition 2.
Proposition 3
The output of the model economy can be expressed as
where
Evaluating the integrals in (7) gives Further simplification and substituting B out results in
Next, I apply the Leibniz integral rule twice to take the derivative of (7) with respect to Z.
Evaluating the integrals and simplifying gives
To show the result, I evaluate the ratio of (9) and (8) at Z = 0. After some algebra, this results in
Since k does not enter the numerator, it suffices to compare the denominator when k = k S = aη versus when k = k P = ab. By definition η > 1, and η > b = [φη α + 1 − φ] 1/α . I set η = d, which implies b = φη. In this 'knife-edge' case, the two equilibria coexist. It is the situation of interest. The economy switches from a pooling to a separating equilibrium at this point, and the volatility changes. Substituting into (10), the claim
is true becauseǭ has lower bound aη−Z (aη) 1−α by construction.
Evaluating this at Z = 0 impliesǭ > (aη) α . Pluggingǭ 's lower bound into (11), and subbing c out of equation (11) 
